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PREFACE· 
This study is concerned with the analysis of the rationale of 
involvement of the United States and Thailand in the Vietnam War. The 
major objective was to investigate the commitments made between the two 
states which determined their pattern of relationships in the region as a 
result of the Vietnam conflict. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his thesis adviser, 
Professor Harold V. Sare, for his guidance and assistance throughout the 
entire study. Appreciation is also expressed to the other committee 
members, Professor Clifford A. L. Rich and Professor Raym9nd Habiby, for 
their assistance in the preparation of the final manuscript. 
A note of thanks is given to.Mr. Mi.chael Phillips, the author's 
former classmate, for his valuable suggestions. In addition, appreciation 
is also extended to Mrs. Dixie Jennings·. for typing the final copy. 
Finally, special gratitude is expressed to his parents, brother and 
sisters in Thailand for their understanding and encourageme~t. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Since 1950, the United States' foreign policy toward the Southeast 
Asian countries has been based on the objective of containing communist 
states and political movements in the region. The containment policy has 
involved the United States in military conflict in Korea, Vietnam and 
Cambodia. Bilateral and multilateral alliances have been negotiated with 
states in the region to prevent t~e People's Republic of China and the 
Soviet Union from expanding their political influenc;:e into the states 
along the communist perimeter. Under the influence of the United States, 
several Southeast Asian countries have developed their Asian policies 
around this series of alliances. The Southe~st Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), which became a basic instrument of the United States' policy in 
Southeast Asia, was a major creation in this regard. To Southeast Asian 
leaders, SEATO has represented an American defense commitment to the area 
as a whole which has served to deter China from political interference in 
the region. 
After the def eat of the French in Vietnam, Indochina became a direct 
concern of the United States, since it was perceived that communist 
expansion of military force was,in progress. The Un~ted .States govern"'.' 




As the United States became more.involved, there was a tendency of 
cooperation from other states in the region which indicated a willingness 
to join a regional·effort against the Communists' aggression. American 
policy planners regarded Thailand as one of the few reliable states in an 
othez:wise confused region. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State 
Dulles seemed to view Thailand as an Asian "model" of a modernizing 
"freedom-loving" coun~ry; its leader, Phiboon Songkram, was considered to 
be a reliable friend who was ready to "stand up and be counted" on the . 
side of the United States. "Thail~nd, if assured of United States guar-
antees of adequate performance, would probably permit the use of Thai 
territory and bases," declared a National Security Council "Action'' paper 
dated April 5, 1954. Confidence was also expressed that Thailand could 
be depended upon to join a regional grouping which would give moral and 
some military support to the ,United States' military intervention . 1 The 
rise of a.local communist guerrilla threat in the northeastern part of 
the country and fear of Chinese an.cl Vietnamese expansion forced the Thai 
Government to seek a firmer American.commitment to .the defense of the 
region. 
Following the .establishment of SEATO, United States military leaders 
stressed the need for an appropriate mechanism to deploy American forces 
in support of friendly indigenous regimes in the area. The United States 
at first becrame involved in the Vietnam conflict with technical advisers 
and.economic aid and later became a full military participant and the 
sustaining power in support of the South Vietnamese Government. Declining 
fortunes in South Vietnam during 1964 shifted United States-Thai relations 
toward a greater commitment.to Thailand by the United States, which 
resulted in the use of Thailand as a major base area for military action 
in Vietnam. The government of Thailand was asked to make an active con-
tribution to the conduct of the war against North Vietnam by permitting 
the basing of America's principal attack forces on its territory. In 
1967, this commitment of bases was suppleme!).ted.in a significant way by 
Thailand's agreement to ._send ground forces. into South Vietnam. 
It was in.this context that the United States eyolved its policy 
toward Thailand,. This study will investigate the major factors why.the . ' 
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United s.tates' ratfonale of involvement in .the Vietnam conflict kept 
chiµiging after )954 and hqw Thailand fitted into this poli~y. An attempt 
will also be made to answer the, ques't;ions: Why did the Thai government 
acc;ept a role of military involveme~t in.the Vietnam conflict, and why 
did the United States seek regional involvement by SEATO in the Vietnam 
war? 
Hypothe~is 
Th,e hypothesis of this study will assert that; the .major objective of 
the United States toward Thailand was tQ esc~late its political and mili-
tary commitment in support.of the South Vietnamese regime. Participation 
of Thailand was demonstrated by the Thai troop deployment and the agree-
ment permitting the United States to .use air bases in Thailand. By. 
insisting that the commitment to the Saigon regime was binding under the 
' ' . . . 
Southeast Asian Defense Treaty.and various bilateral economic and mili-
tary assistance agreements with Thailand, an important rationale for 
United States action was provided. The·United States assumed that these 
supportive activities under the various alliances gave :it cei:tain ad-. 
vantages in the conflict. This propositio~ is based on the efforts of 
the United States to increase Thailand's support for t~e United States' 
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military and diplomatic objectives in the area. For Thailand, a felt 
need to maintain its political stability through a military regime which 
required strong economic and military support from the United States 
forced the Thai Government to accept a role of military involvement in 
that conflict. 
In order to test the hypothesis, it will be necessary to verify some 
implied premises. First, this study will attempt to show that the United 
States regarded Thailand as an important base area and ally in support of 
an escalation of United States military action in the war. Also, this 
study will focus upon the question of the rationale for Thai military 
participation in the Vietnam War. 
The policy of multilateral involvement in the Vietnam conflict was 
designed by American policy makers in cooperation with its SEATO allies 
as a collective self defense action against the communist bloc. Its pur-
pose was to contain the spread of communist influence in Southeast Asia, 
strengthen the status quo there and facilitate the rational use of 
regional resources. This proposition will be applied to United States 
involvement in Asian affairs and in the Vietnam War. Beginning with the 
SEATO conference and successive consultations between American officials 
and its allies, the United States sought to gain approval of its commit-
ments in the Vietnam War. This action was successful in acquiring the 
support of Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Thailand. 
Literature Review 
Although many writings are available which analyze the Indochinese 
War and the role of the ,United States in that war, many of the studies 
have viewed the American involvement in the Vietnam War as a part of the 
broader "containment of Communism policy of the United States." Little 
attention has been devoted to the analysis of the relationship of the 
United States and individual countries in the ,region in reference to the 
war. For example, Frank C. Darling in his book, Thailand and the United 
States, viewed the relationship in the context of broader aspects of 
American foreign policy ru:id foi;eign aid. Since 1954, he writes, the 
United States looked increasingly to Thailand as one.of the most secure 
bases for the military defense of the region. Darling stressed that 
American policy in Thailand was part. of an overall strategy designed to 
promote the security and progress of the region. 2 
L. Edward Shuck viewed the nature of the Thai connnitment to the 
United States as going far beyond the mere superficial diplomatic liai-
sons in which the Thai government lq~g sought security while it was 
caught in conflicts between the greater powers. 3 
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Russell H. Fifield's book, Southeast Asia in United States 
Policy, the author implied that an extremely important element of the 
United States policy in this period was the inability of the United 
States to escape responsibility for the region's security. This commit-
ment is reflected in a system of bilateral and multilateral defense 
treaties covering much of Southeast Asia. The treaty area of SEATO was 
the broadest multilateral example in Asia and the Pacific. 4 Thailand has 
served the United Stat~s' objectives in this area. 
In the eyes of a veteran of fifteen years' service with the United 
States Government and two years in Thailand, Donald E. Nuechterlein in 
his book, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, sees the problems 
of the country through the eyes of the current leaders of Thailand, view-, 
ing their claims for the legitimacy of Thai influence (under the United 
States' strong support) in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam as valid without 
question. This led him to make unsupported assertions about the neces-
sity of the .United States' support for Thai claims in Southeast Asia. 5 
In this regard, Bernard K. Gordon has made three important points: 
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First, for several years Thailand had allowed the United States to 
develop a.number of air bases on Thai soil for American Air Force mis-
sions. Second, Thailand itself had become the target of increasing 
Peking-supported subversion and the United States wanted to prevent fur-
ther expansion of China's influence in the country and the possibility of 
a "new Vietnam". Third, Thailand had begun to play a very effective role 
in Southeast Asia's international politics, especially as a key promoter 
of regional cooperation. 6 In his view, this was particularly important 
to American leaders who saw in Asian regionalism an important way to help 
small and weak Southeast Asian nations build an effective barrier against 
a resurgent China. 
Methodology 
The methodology of this study will be descriptive and analytical. 
Chapter I will provide a detailed description of American commitments to 
Thailand, which must take into account the .time and circumstances when 
the commitments and means were used. Chapter II will present the back-
ground of United States-Thai relations during which time Thailand became 
an important base area and ally in the region in support of an escalation 
of the United States' military action in the Vietnam conflict. It will 
be concerned with the immediate post-war policy of the United States 
toward Thailand and the region. It .will be shown that American commit-
ments to Thailand have grown with the extension of the conflict in 
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Indochina. Chapter III will examine the specific relationships which 
evolved between the United States and Thailand over the political and 
military intervention in Vietnam. This chapter will attempt to show that 
the United States sought to escalate its involvement by massive use of 
force in the .Vietnam War and regional involvement through SEATO. Chapter 
IV will discuss why the United States believed it necessary to commit 
itself to an intimate alliance with Thailand for mutual defense in this 
conflict. Thailand responded to the .United States' coIIDilitments and con-
tributed to the war in Vietnam by sending troops and providing bases for 
United States aircraft. A careful analysis of the reasons why Thailand 
was so important politically and strategically for the United States to 
carry on this war will be made. The last chapter will present conclu-
sions concerning the role of Thailand in the United States' policy and 
how this provided a rationale for the United States' action. 
This study will depend primarily upon materials gathered from 
official United States government sources, particularly the Department of 
States and Department of Defense bulletins, hearings and studies of the 
United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Public Papers of 
the Presidents, documents relating to alliances, international confer-
ences and statements and pronouncements of the two parties concerned. 
Books, professional journals and memoirs will be utilized to provide 
additional insights. 
Significance 
Whatever conclusions are drawn in Vietnam, there still is the ques-
tion why Thailand was so acquiescent and available to the United States. 
For the manner in which the United States attempted to fulfill its 
commitments and the means it employed in th~ war, whether political, 
economic or military or any combination thereof, may well determine the 
rationalization for the United States' objectives in the conflict. The 
significance of this study rests upon the relationship between a large 
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power and a small state in the region of major conflict. How did the 
large power relate to the small state in that kind of situation? What 
inducements were offered? What contributions were expected? Perhaps it 
would reflect the complexities and dilemmas of American foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia: or perhaps the~e were some signs that a viable commit-
ment could be deve~oped and that it was necessary to risk an entangling 
involvement. 
FOOTNOTES 
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3L. Edward Shuck, "Thailand: Groping Toward Neutrality," Current 
History (December, 1973), p. 258. 
4Russel H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New 
York, 1963), pp. 407-409. ~ ~ 
5Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast 
Asia (New York, 1965), p. 160. 
6Bernard K. Gordon, "Thailand: Its Meaning for the United States," 
Current History (January, 1967), p. 16. 
9 
CHAPTER II 
THE UNITED STATES-THAI RELATIONS: THE 
UNITED STATES' POST WAR POLICY 
After World War II the United States asstu11ed a dominant position of 
power and responsibility over the entire Pacific area. During the past 
two decades American influence and power has penetrated Southeast Asia in 
a spectacular and decisive way. Accordingly, the United States has be-
come extremely sensitive to political developments threatening the status 
quo in these areas now considered vital to its security interests. 
American strategy and policies for Asia took into account the capa-
bilities of the People's Republic of China and other countries of Asia, 
particularly those that were not under conununist control but which might 
be presumed to be facing a potential communist threat. Opposition to the 
expansion of communist power in Southeast Asia required the expenditure 
of considerable American energy and resources. 
After the Korean War, United States policies in Asia gradually 
developed along the lines of the "containment" doctrine so successfully 
applied to the Soviet Union in Europe after 1947 and later extended to 
Asia. George F. Kennan has described the containment policy as follows: 
Balanced against this (the rivalry between the United States 
and the.Soviet Union) ·are the .facts that Russia, as opposed to 
the Western world in genel;'al, is still by far the weaker party, 
that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which. will 
eventually weaken its own total potential. This would itself 
warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence 
upon the policy of firm containment, designed to confront the 
Russian with alterable counter fore~ at every point where they 
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show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and 
stable world.1 
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After the United States had adjusted in some measure to the Soviet chal-
lenge in Europe, the United States government began to view the problem 
of Chinese power in Asia in much_ the same light as that posed by Soviet 
power in Europe, as though both threats could be contained by similar 
responses. 2 In both Asia and Europe containment measures reflected a 
perceived need for complementary interaction.between military policies 
and aid programs in order to prevent aggression by communist powers and 
foster the internal stability of tbe states in the area.3 
The United States government, fearing that the People's Republic of 
China would forcefully extend its boundary and influence into Southeast 
Asia, took the lead to provide a deterrent. During the Korean Conflict, 
President Truman increased military assistance to.the Philippines and to 
the forces of France in Indochina; he ordered the United States Seventh 
Fleet to patrol the waters between mainland China and Formosa. 4 In 
August and September of 1951 the Truman Administration negotiated mutual 
defense treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.s It 
signed a similar pact with Japan, which gave the United States the right 
to maintain land, air, and naval forces in and about that country. 6 
There seemed to be no choice for the United States but to use mili-
tary means to prevent changes in Southeast Asia that might endanger its 
interests. President Truman developed an Asian policy around a series of 
alliances aimed at the containment.of the communist states. 7 In addition 
to the earlier pacts, the United States signed treaties with the 
Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in 1951, and with the 
Republic of Korea in October, 1953. 8 When the French Army in Indochina 
was defeated in 1954, Secretary of State Dulles believed that further 
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communist aggression in Southeast Asia was but a question of time. 9 He 
also believed that what was needed was some sort of an alliance system 
for the region. The Southeast Asian Organization (SEATO) was negotiated 
in September of 1954. 10 The treaty organization was to become a basic 
instrument of .United States policy in Southeast Asia. 
The organization comprised the Uni'1:ed States, Great Britain, France, 
Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. 11 It 
was signed at a time when Communist China was making strong in-roads 
into Southeast Asia and when anti-colonialism was r~mpant. The common 
denominator for membership was an evaluation of the communist threat to 
national security coupled with a conviction that collective defense was 
the best way to deal with the menace. 12 It is important to recall the 
essential terms of the treaty in Article IV, paragraph 1: 
Each party recognizes that aggression by means of arms attack 
in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any 
state or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may 
hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, 
and agree that it will in that event act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Meas-
ures taken in this paragraph shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council of the United Nations. 13 
In an understanding approved by the other signatories, the United States 
declared that its obligations under the article applied only to 
"communist aggression". 14 SEATO was, therefore, intended to be the back-
bone of the United States defense structure in Southe~st Asia. However, 
Secretary Dulles suggested that the United States would not maintain 
forces in the countries of the region for the purpose of deterring 
aggression, but would develop a mobile striking force that could respond 
when needed. 15 
Actually the organization had little real strength. The Asian mem-
bers possessed only limited conventional weapons and were militarily weak. 
13 
The European members were withdrawing from the region and could not be 
realistically depenqed upon to make major contributions. The burden for 
maintain~ng the status quo or controlling changes in practical terms 
rested. upon the United States,16 
SEATO was but one of a number of responses to the 1954 settlement of· 
the war between the .Pren.ch and the .Vietnamese. It provided a legal 
ratio11ale for much of America's freedoIJ.l to maneuyer in the .region. Many 
~ave the organization credit for m~king some communist states recognize 
the danger involved in committing overt aggress~on. During the. 1950's 
and most of the 1960's, much attention was given to the problem of sub-
version. However, SEATO had difficulty defining the problem, much less 
coping with it; Its most.effective capabilities were oriented toward 
deterring direct military attack. 
To the United States, Southeast Asia was to become a cordon sanitaire 
against the Chinese communists. 17 United States policy in Southe~st Asia, 
and Indochina in particular, evolved from reliance upon the major Euro-
pean powers (France and Great Britain) in the region to direct involve-
ment. It was in this context that the United States evolved its policy 
toward Thailand. 
Thailand was increasingly concerned over the expansi9n of communism 
in Southeast Asia. The intrusion of communist influence accelerated 
Thailand's quest for security through arrangements with the,great powers. 
She became a major ally of the United States-in the context of United 
States-Indochinese policy. 
Thailand was politically orient~d toward the West prior to World War 
I, especially the United States and Great Britain. Relations between 
United States and Thailand rest~d on a long and cordial basis. The first 
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treaty ever negotiated between two countries was made in 1833 by the Thai 
King, Rama III, and Edmond Roberts, a diplomatic envoy sent to Southeast 
Asia by President Andrew Jackson. For over a century American Protestant 
missionaries had entered Thailand in small numbers and initiated reforms 
in education, medicine, and technology. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century King Chulalongkorn had employed advisers from the Harvard Law 
School to assist the kingdom in abolishing extraterritoriality and other 
"unequal" treaty restrictions. Throughout this era good-will was created . 
and many friendships were formed. The Thai often looked to the United 
States for moral support in their struggles with the British and the 
French, and many Americans voiced.their admiration for the only small 
country in Asia to remain independent from European colonial rule. 18 
Leaders of the Thai revolution in 1932, while paying lip service to 
democratic aspirations, eventually decided, after witnessing the ascending 
star of Japan in East Asia, to cultivate Tokyo's support in.preference to 
that of the United States and Great Britain. The prospects of liquidating 
French power in Indochina after 1940 afforded a tempting opportunity for 
Thailand to recover territories lost to France between 1893 and 1907. 
Bangkok occupied two French-held enclaves on the right bank of the upper 
Mekong River in 1940, and later accepted Japanese "mediation" of addi-
tional claims to extensive segments of Laos along the same valley, plus 
three Cambodian provinces adjacent to Thailand. Other territories in 
Northern Malaysia and along the Shan State border with Burma were added 
by Thailand with Japanese approval during the course of World War II. 
American influence in Bangkok reached a low point in 1942, when the 
Thai government, responding to further Japanese demands, declared war on 
both the United States and Great Britain. America's mild reaction to the 
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Thai declaration of war \\fas conditioned in part by the refusal of the 
astute Thai ambassador in Washington, M. R. Seni Pramoj, to deliver the 
declaration on the grounds that it was unrepresen.tative of Thai public 
opinion and therefore of dubious validity. By cooperating with Pramoj 
and the emerging "Free Thai Movement", Washington was able in time to es-
tablish useful intelligence contacts reaching into Bangkok itself. When 
the war in the Pacific .turned against; the .Japanese, a changing of the 
guard in Bangkok from Phibun to Pridi brought leaders of the Free Thai 
Movement to power, thus strengthening plans for Thai-American cooperation 
in the post war period. How useful this connection might have proved in 
the .event of an attempted Allied military conquest of Thailand was never 
to be tested, but, because of it, Washington felt justified in opposing 
punitive sanctions proposed by the British after the war. Bangkok's 
declaration of war was ignored and Thailand's entry into the United 
Nations was supported by the United States government. 19 
Thailand's success after the war was due to the United States, whose 
post war policies in Southeast Asia at the .time .favored the establishment 
of free and independent states rather than the reinstitution of the 
colonial empires. 20 To a certain extent it could be argued that the 
United States was replacing the British and the French in that area. 
The Thai government, in a pragmatic assessment of world politics, 
gave particular attention to the strengths and goals of the great powers. 
One of the major guiding principles of Thai foreign policy has been to 
adjust to "the world as defined by the great powers". 21 Thailand's 
present alignment was largely the result of an assessment of the existing 
world power structure, not a common ideological commitment. 22 For 
instance, during the Korean War, the Thai government saw an excellent 
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opportunity to win American good-will through forthright support of 
American policy in Korea by sending Thai combat troops into action. The 
Thai contribution to the war was warmly received by the Un~ted States 
government. Also, Thai values stress the virtues of reserve and emotional 
non-involvement and, therefore, adjustment to any given set of circum-
stances. Throughout the cataclysmic events of the last three decades, 
Thailand. has always managed to be . allied to the dominant power in the 
region. 23 
Between 1950 and 1960 Thailand was devoted to the notion of collec-
tive security. Thailand's participation in the United Nations, including 
her small contribution of troops in Korea, and the provision of facilities 
for the United Nations, SEATO, and other international agencies in Bangkok 
were token of the government's interest in collective security efforts. 
The United States began at the same time to organize its As.ian and Pacific 
position through multilateral military commitments to Japan, Nationalist 
China on Taiwan, the Philippines and Thailand, which responded favorably 
to this line of American policy.2 4 
The expanding interest of the United States in Southeast Asia coin-
cided with Thailand's rising alarm over the growth of communist power in 
China and Vietnam. The leadership in Thailand became concerned when the 
government of the People's Republic of China announced that one of its 
major targets for revolutionary change was Thailand. 25 Although full 
scale gu~rrilla warfare ha~ yet to develop, there have been many sporadic 
terrorist activities. Thailand became alarmed over.the intrusion of 
domestic communist cadres into local problem areas. These fears encour-
aged the Thai leadership to bolster its security through arrangements 
with the United States. An effective bilateral defensive alliance was 
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concluded between Thailand and the United States that led to the creation 
of American bases in Thailand. The United States committed itself to the 
defense of Thailand and became involved through various aid and intelli-
gence activities in supporting the Thai regime against internal 
subversion. 
The United States government, after the ,defeat of the French at Dien 
Bien Phu, set as its objective in 1954 the denial of military victory in 
Indochina to the ,Communists. Secretary Dull~s said in March, 1954: 
If the Communist armies achieved victory in Indochina, or any 
part thereof, they would surely resume,the same pattern of 
aggression against other free peoples in the area. Under the 
conditions of today, the imposition in Southeast Asia of the 
political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist 
ally, by whatever means, must be a grave threat to the world 
free community. 26 
Since it was perceived that Communist expansion by military force was in 
progress, the .United States government assumed the ,"protectorate position" 
of the French when they left in 1954. After the Geneva Conference of 
1954, Ngo Dinh Diem was placed in power in South Vietnam. Although.the 
new regime may have been legitimate in the international sense, it still 
faced the difficult task of actually winning domestic support and acquir-
ing legitimacy within a divided and fragmented country. Following the 
Geneva settlement, the United States backed the Diem regime against the 
Communists. The United States supplied technical advisers and economic 
aid and eventually became a full military participant and the sustaining 
power in support of the South Vietnamese regime. As the United States 
became more involved in Vietnam, its policy planners sought to involve 
other states in the region against the Communists. The United States' 
military leaders stressed the need to deploy American forces in the area 
and viewed Thailand as a suitable place. 
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A National Security Council staff study made in February, 1952, 
argued that if Indochina were lost to the Communists, Thailand would be 
exposed to "infiltration and severe political pressure as well as direct 
attack". The political pressure alone might indue the Thais to seek an 
accommodation with "internati9nal communism" unless "substantial aid" and 
assurance of military support by the United States were provided.27 The 
policy adopted by the United States under Truman's administration was 
that Thailand should be kept oriented towards the United States through 
"substantial aid" and "assurances" of American support. 28 
According to Frank C. Darling, who served in the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) for several years, the United States sent twenty-eight ship-
ments of arms to Thailand in addition to an unspecified number of fighter 
aircrafts and naval vessels during 1952. A Military Assistance Advisory 
Group (MAAG) was also established in Thailand. 29 The Truman administra-
tion was convinced that the investment it had made in Thailand was bene-
ficial in achieving United States objectives in the region. John M. 
Allison, Assistant Secretary of State.for Far Eastern Affairs, expressed 
satisfaction over the fact that American representatives were working in 
close cooperation with the .officials of this "small but important nation, 
which has a long tradition of independ~nce and finnly against 
connnunism. 1130 
American policy planners were forced to give much attention to 
developing policy alternatives that were oriented toward building 
"sufficient strength in the area". 31 At a meeting on August 30, 1956, 
the Nationa+ Security Council restated the policy contention that the 
national independence of .the mainland Southeast Asian states was impor-
tant to the security interests of the United States. It went on to make 
a significant statement that: 
The United States' policy should not depend primarily on the 
degree and nature of Communist activity at any particular time, 
but should seek to promote these goals within the limits of the 
United States' resources available in the area,3 2 
In the late l950's, Vietnam and Laos became trouble spots for 
American planners. The Department of Defense submitted "Operation Plan 
for Vietnam", which was approvecl by the Operations . Coordinating Board 
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(OCB) of the Natio~al Security Council on January 4, 1959. This Depart-
ment of Defense document presented contingency plans prepared by the 
United States Army, Navy, and Air Force calling for execution in accord-
ance with the United States' policy in the event of an actual or imminent 
Communist attempt to seize control o:f South Vietnam from within. The 
plan also envisaged a whole spectrum of American activities to bolster 
the South Vietnamese regime and to defeat the Vietcong and its allies.3 3 
As .the United States became more deeply involved in the Indochinese 
conflict, the United States government made commitments to the Thai 
government to strengthen Thai defense capabilities through greater joint 
efforts and by military assistance, including armed forces. 34 Moreover 
the United States government under Kennedy's leadership reassured the 
Thai government that its independence was as critical to the United 
States as that of South Vietnam.35 
Yet, despite this strong support for American role ancl presence in 
Southeast Asia--in fact, because of it--Thaila.i:id also constituted an 
important foreign policy problem for the United States. America, with 
its global concerns and responsibilities as well as with one very hot war 
on its hands in Southeast Asia, faced the possibility that its Thai ally 
might also become involved in a serious Communist revolutionary war. 
Peking had already made a start in this direction and openly proclaimed 
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its goals to be the capture of Thailand. The United States was pledged 
to defend Thailand not only under the SEATO pact but also on a bilateral 
basis following a joint statement issued by Secreatry of State Dean Rusk 
and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman on March 6, 1962. That statement 
declared: 
The Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United States 
regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of 
Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United States 
and to world peace. He expressed the firm intention of the 
United States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in 
resisting Communist aggression and subversion ..•• The Secre-
tary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the United 
States does not depend upon the prior agreement of other 
parties to the .Treaty (SEATO) since this Treaty.obligation is 
individual as well as collective. 36 
On May 15, 1962 President Kennedy announced that, at the invitation 
of the Thai government, he had ordered "additional elements of the United 
States' military forces, both groWld and air, to proceed to Thailand and 
to remain there until further orders. 11 37 The Thai government probably 
did not have very mucy to do with the "invitation" to deploy American 
forces in.its territory. It was an American decision and consultation 
with Thailand appeared to have been prefunctory. 38 
It is interesting to note that there is evidence that this decision 
was related to the plan which called for the use of American forces in 
Thailand in support of future military action in Vietnam. From the Task 
Force Program of the Department of Defense itself and another joint State-
Defense Department paper, the Departments of State and Defense reconunended 
a substantial escalation of American commitments in South Vietnam. How-
ever, if the escalation were to take place in Vietnam, it was evident that 
the United States' need for Thai cooperation would also increase. The 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific recommended. the pre-stocking of railroad, 
rolling stock, petroleum, oil, lubricants, ammunition, heavy engineering 
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equipment, and other materials in Southeast Asia "for the use by the 
United States forces in contingency actions". All this would, as Lieu-
tenant-General Earl D. Wheeler, Director, Joint Staff pointed out, neces-
sitate the.early conclusion of a bilateral agreement with Thailand. 39 
The Thai government agreed to accept this "military assistance" be-
cause of the deteriorating military situation in Laos and Vietnam and 
because Bangkok was granted the right to restrict the use of military 
facilities to the defense of Thailand and its vital interests. The 
appearance of American air and ground forc~s during the 1962 Laos crisis, 
the reten.tion of an American air presence thereafter, and the more active . 
military role played by the United States in Laos and Vietnam helped to 
make the Thai-American connection, strengthened by the .Rusk-Thanat 
accord, m()re intimate than ever. The rise of the guerrilla thre~t in the 
mid 1960's further strengthened Thai interest in the alliance and the 
direct help it could provide for internal security and stability. 
The mighty technological and military resources of the United States 
were already. on the way .to contain the ''threat" posed by just 10 ,000 
Vietcong troops in South Vietnam and a few thousand Pathet Lao, the 
communist-led movement in Laos. The North Vietnamese were providing such 
assistance to these forces as they could spare from their own meager 
resources. The Soviet Union, too, had air-lifted supplies to the Pathet 
Lao. However, by this time it was unmistakably clear.that the Sino-Soviet 
split had become serious and that neither China nor the Soviet Union 
wanted to be involved singly.in a shooting war with the United States. 
The United States called for a military victory and escalated its 
involvement in the Vietnam conflict. In this crusade, Thailand was to be. 
a sub-junior partner whose support and coope~ation were to be insured, as 
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in the ,Truman and Eisenhower yearsJ by "assurances" and "generous aid". 
Kennedy, indeed, had plans for Thailand. To secure Thai approval of 
anticipated American requirements, he initiated discussions through a 
joint Thai-American committee set up in Bangkok on a series of issues 
supposedly designed to overcome the "weakness in Thailand's logistical 
structure". This referred to the American commitments to Thailand under 
the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty and othe~ bilateral agree-
ments on economic and military assistance whose purpose was to provide 
"an important basis for United States actions to help Thailand meet 
indirect aggression11 • 40 In the 1960's, extensive aid programs were ex-
tended to Thailand (a cumulative total of $315.0 million in economic and 
$423.3 million in military assistance by 1963), 41 and important projects 
in communications.and transportation were launched. Air base facilities 
in the cent~al and northeast regions were constructed in the early 1960's 
which enabled the ,United States to send substantial aid and immediate 
military support to the Indochinese states to the east. Thai soil had 
potential long range value for the United States as long as the United 
States continued to exercise its influence in Southeast Asia. 
In the years since.1962, Thailand has become the western-most anchor 
of a network of United States military bases that extend all the way to 
Japan. Despite the lack of regional diplomatic _integration in security 
affairs and the various restrictions on America's.freedom to treat its 
strong points around the Chinese periphery as a truly integrated defense 
system, the physical potential was there, and Thailand made.an importi;tnt 
contribution to it. Moreover, in practice, the United States gained a 
surprising degree of .area-wide mobility from its "diplomatically 
disconnected" network.4 2 
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CHAPTER III 
VIETNAM INTERVENTION AND MILITARY 
BUILD-UP IN·THAILAND 
, , , under, th.e situation in Indochina, the United, States has 
held, to a stable and consistent course an4 has made.clear the. 
condition whicl;l, in its opinion~ might justify intervention. . 
These cond,itions.were and are (1) an invitation from. present 
lawful authorities) (2) cle~r as~urance ·of complete independ-
en.ce ·to. Laos,. Cambodia and Vietnam; (3) evidence of concern by 
the United.Natiqns; (4) ajoining of collect::j.ve effort of some 
of the,othe;i: nations,in the area, and (5) assurance.that France 
will n()t itself withd~aw from the battle .. until it is won. 1 
United States policy as stated elsewhere.in this thesis wast() main-
tain a compatible regime in South Vietnam to h~lp contain the conununi~t 
mo~emen.t in Soutneast Asia .. For this reason t~e American lea~ership felt 
compelled to cqmmit the .UnitE;ld States ,long .before the G.eneva Conferenc~ 
be~an in Aprq, 1954 to the maintenance of .a "free" or a pro-Western 
regime in Vietn.am. 2 However, the ,Unit~d States .refused to commit mili-
tary.forces to.the Indochinese Conflict un.til the 1960's. Credits and 
material. aid were supplied to the .. Fren~h in hopes of s~staining the. 
French position in Indochina, which in,directly would enable the United 
States tq achieve .its objectives. 3 · Un.ited\Stat~s aid, howeve:r;-, did not 
accomplish, its intended purpose.and the situation continued to deterio-
rate Until the French military. forces were forced. to surrender at Dien 
Bien Phu on May 8, U~54. Following the Geneva ·negotiation,s in .1954 which. 
militarily parti tion,ed ViE;'ltnam,. the United States ~egan to extend aid to 
strengthen: the. defense of South Vietnam and. to convert L.aos into a 
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pro-Western stronghold that could shield Thailand from North Vietnam and 
deny the Communists in South Vietnam access to supplies from the North. 
The Indochinese War was officially regarded by Washington as a con-
test between a non-conununist state and a conununist state (North Vietnam), 
and not as a civil war between contending forces for control of the gov-
ernment within a single state. The agreement of the Geneva Conference on 
July 21, 1954 was interpreted by the United States leadership as a diplo-
matic victory for the North Vietnamese regime. 4 According to the Geneva 
accord, the partition was clearly described as a military regroupment of 
forces. It involved the establishment of no political boundaries and 
certainly provided no basis for the establishment of a separate state in 
the South or the North. The Geneva accord explicitly read that within a 
period of two years national elections were to be held on the .basis of 
which a single government for all of Vietnam would be established. The 
Vietminh had every reason to believe that they could win the elections 
because the major elements of the population in both the North and South 
knew that it was the Vietminh regime, now established in the North, that 
had driven out the French; and many landless peasants were aware that it 
was the Vietminh that had divided up the estates of absentee landlords and 
distributed the land. The Southern regime under Ngo Dinh Diem's leader-
ship did not have the nationalist credentials enjoyed by the Northern 
leadership. Ho Chi Minh, who during the previous decade had been the ac-
knowledged head of the Vietnamese nationalist movement, simply could not 
be displaced by Diem as a nationalist leader. Diem's support came pri-
marily from the United States. To many he was not know, and he was absent 
from the country during the critical years of the war against the French. 5 
In effect, both the United States and South Vietnam accepted only those 
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aspects of the Geneva accord that were advantageous and repudiated those 
provisions that were regarded to be cont~ary to their interests. Thus, 
with AmericB:n support, the elections were never held. The Hanoi govern-
ment persisted in its effort to arrange for the promised elections, but 
Diem, consistently backed by the United States, refused. During the 
first three years of the post Geneva period there was a lull in military 
activity. Hanoi did not openly support the insurrectionary activity in 
the South, though the United States assisted the Diem regime in building 
its police forces and administration. By repudiating the essence of the 
Geneva agreement Diem made civil war inevitable. In a civil war in 
which the military struggle.for power ends on the condition that the 
competition will be transferred to the political level, the side which 
repudiates the terms should expect military conflict to be resumed. 6 
Consequently, the United States moved rapidly to strengthen the South 
Vietnamese regime and its economy so that the South Vietnamese government 
might successfully m.aintain itself vis-a-vis the Communists. 
Why did the ,policy of .the United States take this course? In.the 
thinking of Eisenhower and ,Dulles, Indochina was the key to all of South-
east Asia. This became known as the domino theory. In the words of 
Eisenhower: "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first 
one, and what will happen to the last one is the certain~y that it will 
go, very quickly." 7 So vital was the region considered to be to American 
interests in Asia and the .Pacific that Dulles asserted that a communist 
take-over in Indochina would carry a grave threat to Thailand, the 
Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. 8 
The United States government believed that the loss of Vietnam would 
have a multiplier effect which could disrupt the "status quo" within Asia 
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and lead to permanent conununist hegemony in the region. Indochina became 
the last bastion for the preservation of anti-communist power in the Far 
East. If the United States wanted to prevent conununist expansion any.,. 
where in Asia, it felt that it had to prevent the .communist domination of 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Hence, during the post-Geneva 
Conference period, the United States government was concerned with the 
development of the South Vietn~mese regime; this.was paralleled by an 
effort to increasingly involve its allies, especi~lly Thailand, in an 
effort to resist the Communists. 
By 1963, it haq become clear to President Kennedy that Diem's 
leadership was incapable of stenuning the rapid political and military 
disintegration of the regime. Diem had failed to develop the loyalty of 
the South Vietnamese people; he lacked a capable and effective adminis-
trative organ~zation, a dedicated and trained party cadre, and a unified 
and well trained military establishment. The test came as insurrection-
ary activity, supported by the.Nert~, began to intensify and make serious 
inroads into the areas controlled by the So~thei:n regime. 9 The massive 
build up of American aid to the.South Vietnamese was not sufficient to 
overcome the weakness of the regime. In fact, the Vietcong benefited 
from the vast infusion of American.weapons into the conflict as the 
Vietnamese Army lost ground.lo 
On November first and second 1963, a coup d'etat occ~rred in which 
President Diem and his closest colleagues were killed or imprisoned. A 
military backed civilian government assumed office on November 4, 1963, 
and a Military Revolutionary Council was formed under Major General Duong 
Van Minh's leadership. This military junta ruled South Vietnam until it 
was replaced by the.bloodless coup d'etat of January 30, 1964 by Major 
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General Nguen Khani Connnander of the Army's First Corps. It was 
immediately.recognized by the United States government and aid was prom-
ised to sustain the new military regime.1 1 By the end of 1964 the crisis 
continued as Saigon's position eroded politically and militarily at an 
accelerated. rate. The dete:r;ioration of the military situ.ation was re-
fleeted in the increasing rate of desert~ons among new recruits (thirty 
per cent by January 1965), the.disintegration of Saigon's.administrative 
effectiveness and perceptible growth in war weariness among the South 
Vietnamese. Demands for peaceful settl~ment multiplied. In Saigon 
itself, as well as Buddhist strongholds in Hue, students and monks 
publicly advocated an end to the fighting and called for negotiations 
with Hanoi. 12 
During the~e critical months the United States m~litary connnitment 
to t~e South Vietnamese regime increased at an accelerated rate .. The 
United States government under the Johnson administration, fearing that 
the Saigon regime would fall, was determined_to maintain by direct mili-
tary intervention an "independent" South Vietnam. Settlement of the 
conflict by negotiation would require political concessions that would be 
intolerable to South Vietnam and the Un.i ted. States . 13 It was. reas'?nably 
certain that negotiations would require free elec;tions, which would be 
politically un~uitable to the United States and would be contrary to its . . . 
national interests in the region. The strategic purpose of intervention, 
which resulted in rather rapid political and military escalation, pre-
vented such political concessions by South Vietnam. There is some evi-
dence that escalation of the war had been systematically pursued by 
Washington as a means of putting an end to any diplomatic moves, or 
domestic or foreign pressures designed to promote a negotiated settlement 
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of the conflict. 14 President Johnson did assert that he would consider 
any plan that would insure the stability of the South Vietnamese regime. 
He said: "As long as Communist inspired unrest in South Vietnam per-
sists, I think that the preseri.t course we are conducting is the only 
answer and I think that the operation snoulQ be stepped up there. 111 5 The 
essence of the Johnson policy iri. Vietnam was escalation to the degree he 
felt to be necessary to induce the North Vietnamese to withdraw support 
from the National Liberation Front (NLF). The NLF, connnonly referred to 
as the Vietcong, was an anti"'-South Vietnamese government movement 
inspired by the communist ideology. 
The incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin off the North Vietnam coast on 
August 2 and 4, 196416 were useQ to further escalate the United States' 
military role in.the conflict. The United States' conunitme~t to partici-
pate in the war was clearly indicated by such measure~ as the naval and 
air bombardment of North Vietnamese territory early in August 1964 in 
retaliation for the Tonkin Gulf incidents, and by the dispatch of more. 
planes and more American troops to South Vietnam.1 7 The United States 
Congress gave its .support by an overwhelming vote in favor of the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolutionl 8 and by the passage of Sena~e Joint Resolution 189 on 
August 7, 1964 supportin~ "··· the determination of the President ... to 
take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces 
of the United States and to prevent further aggression.'' l 9 
Thus, the United States' political and military COIIUllitment to the 
war in Vietnam was complete. The Tonkin Gulf incidents and the United 
States' raids in response to them marked the beginning of direct military 
involvement by the .United States in the Viet;nam conflict. American 
troops in Vietnam soon reached the level of more than 500,000 men and air 
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war against North Vietnam became very intens.e and costly. 
One of the mo~t disturbing aspects of the,militar~ operation in 
Vietnam to the allies (especially Thailand) of the Un~ted States was the 
inability of the United States to devise an effective means of cQping 
with the.guerrilla warfare used so effectively by the Vietcong and North 
Vietnamese forces. 20 Despite its vast superiority in modern weapons and 
delivery systems, th~ United States at the beginning of 1965 seemed un-
able to effectively counter the Vietcong. FQr three years the United 
States sought to bolster the South Vietnamese forces with modern equip-
. ' 
ment and technical assistance, but the.military situation in South 
Vietnam CQntinued to deteri~rate markedly. Pre)sident Johnson faced the 
harsh choice of eithe~ accepting the humiliating defe~t of ·American. 
policy in Vietnam or of c~anging the grotmd rules to permit the United 
States and its allies to fight the Communists on terms that were more 
favorable .to the United States. The latter alternative focused on the 
use of air power to convince the "Conununist aggressors" that the price 
they had to pay for continuation of the war was too· high. Such a change 
in rules required the continued deployrn~nt of a sizable force of troops 
from the United States and its allies. The) air warfare strategy of the 
United States was warmly endorsed by the Thai-government.and other Asian 
governments.that feared the repercussions of a communist victory in 
Vietnam. 21 
After World War II the United States developed a military position 
in Asia which required military bases, pivotal port facilities, air bases 
.and supply depots to bEl located .in key military positions. This included 
installations in South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, and 
later in Thailand and South Vietnam. Air Force headquarters were located 
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in Japan and the Philippines .and were complemented by the strategic 
island base of Guam to the East. 22 The interdependence of United States. 
forces was demonstrated by the Oahu Base in Hawaii which provided back up 
support and reinforcement for all services and installations, and by 
Clark Air Force Base in the Philippine Islands. In 1964 the Clark Base 
received B-57s from Japan and in 1965 served as a transfer point for 
planes conducting raids above the 17t4 parallel in Vietnam. In addition 
to its value in the Indochina campaign, the Clark Base also remained a 
strategic center for the ,deployment of air power in case of a larger con-
flict. 23 From the~e and other established stronghqlds it wa~ possible to 
move forces into Thailand in 1962 without fear of over extension. These 
bases also served as support units when the United States, during the 
Vietnam War, set up new air bases in central and northeast Thailand, and 
at Bien Hua and Danang in South Vietnam. 
The Thai facilities b~oadened the Ameri9an capacity to use land 
based air power over Laos . and Vietnam as well as to protect Thailand. To 
prepare for other contingencies, a special logistics program for Thailand 
had begun, consisting mainly of rolling stock, mobile pipelines, air 
field improvements, and forward storage depots for ground forces. 24 
Compelling reasons for the Thai government to accept this kind of mili-
tary role in connection with the Vietnam War was the rise of local 
connnunist guerrilla activities in the country and fear of Chinese and 
North Vietnamese expansion. 2 5 The Thai government, a military regime, 
needed economic and military aid to sustain itself against internal 
political threats. Therefore, it sought an even greater American 
connnitment. To help meet.the growing insurgency in the northeast, the 
Thai government asked the United States.to provide it with additional 
military assistance. The United States government extended aid, but 
pursued a policy of non-involvement of United States forces in combat 
operations against the Thai insurgents, 2 6 
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Thailand provided the United States with vital military facilities. 
This involved the substantial build up of United States forces which were 
made up primarily of air force personnel in Thailand. The extent of the 
American military build up was impressive, and the emerging geographic 
pattern was instructive. The United States built its "main line" of air 
bases and supply depots in Thailand's central Khorat plateau. This line 
divides Thailand from the Gulf of Thailand on the south to the Mekong 
River border with Laos on the north (se.e Figure 1). Starting at the cape 
south of Bangkok, the chief American installations.were these: Sattahip 
Naval Base and U-Tapao Base for B-52, the Don Muang Air Field at Bangkok 
itself, and then moving north and east of Bangkok were Khorat, Khon Kaen 
and U-dorn. East of that line on the Mekong River border with Laos, was 
the helicopter and air base at Nakorn Phanom, and due south about 150 
miles was the base at U-bon. Finally, on the line running northwest of 
Bangkok were two more installations, the air base at Takhli and in the 
far northwest near Chiengmai was located an electronic installation 
base. 27 Journalists reported that most flights by American Phantom jets 
into Vietnam--perhaps 1,500 missions each week28 --originated from Takhli, 
Khorat, U-dorn and U-bon Bases. 
In March 1965, following the Vietcong raids on Plaiku in South 
Vietnam, the United States began bombing North Vietnam from Thailand, as 
well as from carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. In 1967, the United States 
began to station B-52s at U-Tapao in Sattahip area for striking targets 
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Figure 1. U. S. Military Bases in Thailand 
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cost~. A typical B-52 sortie from U-Tapao cost $3,440, exclusive of 
munitions costs, compared with $19,937 for a sortie from Guam. By the 
end of 1967, there were approximately 33,000 Air Fore~ personnel, 
approximately 10,300 Army personnel, and 527 air crafts in Thailand.29 
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During this period the major function of Thailand in American South-. 
east Asian strategy was to serve as a center for air operations in the. 
military conflict in South Vietnam. Besides t~e bases, other important 
logistical and support facilities were.constructed; and Bangkok served as 
a major rest and rehabilitation center for the United States soldiers on 
leave from.Vietnam. The number of American military personnel stationed 
in Thailand increased from 400 in 1961 to more than 40,000 in 1967.30 
Without the use of bases in Thailand, only a few hundred miles away from 
the targets in North Vietnam, the American military effort in Vietnam 
would have been more costly and difficult. 
In addition to providi~g bases for United States military operations, 
Thailand agreed to send ground forces to South Vietnam. In September 
1964, Thailand sent a small air lift unit to serve there which totaled 
forty-five men; and in December 1966, a small naval patrol unit numbering 
about 200 men was dispatched to Vietnam. Finally, in early 1967 a ground 
combat unit of 2,207 men was sent there; this was,increased to 11,000 men 
by mid-1967.3 1 The commitment of such a large Thai force was encouraged 
by the United States government. · To support the Thai forces in Vietnam, 
the United States spent about $200 million. The greatest portion of 
these expenditures was used to equip, supply, and sustain the troops in 
Vietnam. · Other American expenses within this total included the payment 
of overseas allowances to Thai officers. Also, a.$15 million increase in 
military assistance to Thailand for each of the two years after 1966 was 
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granted, and a Hawk anti-aircraft battery wa~ provided the Thai govern-
ment. United States officials informed a Senate Foreign Relations 
subcommittee that the main reason that the Thai· government had sent men 
to Vietnam was.to satisfy the strong desire of the United States govern-
ment that they do so.32 
During the Vietnam War many observers in Southeast Asia believed 
that the United States commitment in Thailand had become somewhat perma-
nent.· More than 40,000 American soldiers were stationed in Thailand and 
more than $300 million were spent to equip Thai bases and other military 
facilities. The Sattahip complex constructed by the United States pro-
vided Thailand with a second port which is far bigger than the port at 
Bangkok. The United States.also assisted Thailand in building a road 
net-work that opened up the interi0r.33 
These major economic and military aid programs were designed to meet 
Communist infiltration as well as to provide a base for American military 
operations in Southeast Asia. The United States' commitment was sizable 
and had the appearance of being long-term. The consensus was that 
Washington had no choice because Thailand was essential to the whole 
American strategy in Southeast Asia, and particularly to the war effort 
in South Vietnam. 
As the war continued, the United States.government kept insisting 
that its commitment to South Vietnam and the .military build up in Thailand 
was compatible with the SEATO pact. Under the various bilateral agree-
ments and the commitment under SEATO, the United States legally rational-
iz.ed its freedom to maneuver in the region. One of the under-takings 
which the Johnson Administration constantly cited as proof of a Vietnam 
commitment was the Southeast Asian Treaty.3 4 But the treaty involved no 
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specific American pledge to the South Vietnamese government, which was 
not and could not be a signatory. A protocol to the treaty did provide a 
formal basis for America's military assistance to South Vietnam. How-
ever, the United States justified its military intervention there more on 
the.basis of its direct commitments to Saigon than on the basis of its 
commitments to SEATo.35 
Unlike other signatories to SEATO, who would not agree that the 
treaty's.vague language could possibly be interpreted as a general 
commitment to the South Vietnamese government.3 6 Thailand responded 
favorably to the interpretation made by the United States. From past 
experience, the Thai government reasoned that Thailand had a direct 
security interest to which SEATO seemed to respond. 37 SEATO provided an 
important framework for the bilateral accords between Washington and 
Bangkok. Without it, for instance, a major treaty would have been re-
quired to validate the Rusk-Thanat accord of 1962. 38 As the Thai experi-
ence indicates, the.United States government assumed a higher degree of 
freedom and mobility than what SEATO theoretically conferred. The United 
States repeatedly.asserted its belief in the importance of coalition 
operations; nevertheless, it avoided operating through SEATO whenever 
possible. The 1962 landings in Thailand, the retaliatory strikes and 
escalation in South Vietnam, and appeal for third colllltry assistance to 
Saigon were dramatic illustrations of this tendency. 39 
Under the shadow of American troop presence in Thailand, the govern-
ments of Thailand and the United States issued separate announcements 
concerning the agreement between them for the stationing of United States 
forces in Thailand. The communique issued by the Thai government on May 
15, 1962, cited the Communist-led movements in Laos and also the 
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pro-Communist forces in South Vietnam as con~tituting a threat.to the 
security of the country. Citing the Rusk-Thanat statement of March 6, 
1962, the Thai government reaffirmed its obligation under the SEATO 
treaty to cooperate.with the United States i~ "defending and preserving 
the peace and security of Thailand." The United States President's 
statement issued on the same day said that the joint consideration by the 
two governments concerning the situation in Southeast Asia resulted in 
the "invitation" from the Thai government to the United States.to deploy 
its troops in Thailand. It asserted that this defensive act on the part 
of the United States was wholly consistent with the United Nations 
Charter. 40 
Both the Thai and American.statements emphasized that the action 
taken was in accordance with the obligations under the SEATO agreement of 
1954. However, it is interesting to note that the statement issued by 
the SEATO council on May 16 simply took note of the United States and 
Thai action and did not really endorse it. It did note that the movement 
of American troops to Thailand was "entirely precautionary and defensive 
in character, 1141 In fact~ this document only expressed a concern for 
providing security for the government in Bangkok •. Not one word in the 
memorandum related to the question of Thai bases being used by American 
aircraft as a point from which they could bomb North Vietnam. On the 
contrary, the memorandum su~gested that American military forces .in 
Thailand were to protect tl).at country and to "modernize and enlarged 
Thailand's military and logistical facilities. 1142 But the United States 
ass~med that these supportive activities under the circums1;:ances gave it 
justification to escalate the war in Vietnam. Moreover, the Rusk-Thanat 
accord was a spurious .document. It involved SEATO far beyond what member 
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states had consented to. The interpretation of the SEATO agreement which 
was set forth was not supported by the wording of that treaty. It was, 
in effect, a "hand-shake understanding" between the Johnson Administra-
tion and the Bangkok government.4 3 The Washington~Bangkok agreement in 
this matter was based on the efforts of the United States to increase 
Thailand's support of the American military escalation of the Vietnam 
Conflict. 
These developments of America's role in the conflict reflected the 
United States' policy of containing the spread of communist influence in 
the Southeast.Asian region .. It was believed that strenuous American 
efforts to build a more tenable defense line against Communist subversion 
would contribute to the stability of the region. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THAILAND: ITS MEANING TO THE UNITED 
STATES' VIETNAMESE POLICY 
The presence of American military forces in Thailand raised the 
fundamental question of why Thailand was so strategically important to 
the United States in the Vietnam War. Further, how did American involve-
ment in the Indochinese conflict affect the relationship between the two 
countries in reference to the .war? 
The American government, as early as 1961, made the decision that 
South Vietnam was of critical importance to United States national 
interests in Asia and that its absorption into the Conununist bloc must be 
prevented by a major United States military intervention should the South 
Vietnamese government fail to stem the Vietcong with the help of American 
advisers and equipment. American planners believed that if the United 
States abandoned South Vietnam, it must be prepared to abandon all of 
Southeast Asia. 1 The loss of South Vietnam would adversely affect the 
regional balance of power and American credibility and prestige through-
out the world. 2 The establishment of American military bases in Thailand 
was the consequence of this political decision, which was facilitated by 
the willingness of the Thai government to collaborate in the policy of 
containment.3 
American policy in Thailand during the past two decades has been to 
build that country into a "bastion" of the American block in Southeast 
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Asia through programs to strengthen the will and ability of the Thai 
government to resist Communist China. This line of policy became a major 
concern of the .United States in the region. 4 While the conflict in 
Vietnam was growing and the American commitment to defend the South 
Vietnamese regime against the Communists increased, the major function of 
Thailand in American strategy was to serve, not only as an air base, but 
also as a.n important logistical and support centerfor other American 
military operations. 
American political strategy in Vietnam after 1961 emphasized mili-
tary means. · The South Vietnamese regime was under intense Comnnmist 
attacks from both internal and external sources. The United States and 
various non-Communist governments in Southeast Asia had an interest in 
preserving the independence and territorial integrity of South Vietnam. 
Thailand, throughout these difficult years, played a crucial role in this 
endeavor. Many American experts 5 have observed that without the use of 
Thai bases, the United States' military effort in South Vietnam would 
have been more costly and difficult. 
American air war strategy in Thailand included the use of U-dorn as 
headquarters for the 7th and 13th Air Force, a composite American unit 
controlled from both Saigon and from Clarke Field in the Philippines. 
American officials said that the base was used primarily for reconnais-
sance aircraft, but it had tactical bombers as well. The bases at U-bon, 
U-dorn, Korat and Nakorn.Phanom in northeast Thailand became considerably 
greater in strategic importance after the United States built a fortified 
buffer strip between North and South Vietnam. Following the dictates of 
military strategy, the United States extended the fortified barrier 
across the narrow neck of Laos to the Thai border. This was designed to 
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cut off the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" over which the Connnunists moved men and 
supplies to South Vietnam.6 The base at U-bon, in the southern half of 
the northeast region, had a tactical wing of F-4c Phantom jets, each of 
which could carry over 12,000 pounds of bombs. The base at Korat was 
located at the gateway to the northeast. Aircraft known as F-105 
Thunderchief flew from both Korat and another base at Takhli. B-52s were 
flying from U-tapao, n~ar Sattahip, south of Bangkok. These giant stra-
tegic bombers were not initially flown over North Vietnam, but were used 
in support of ground actions as far north as the demilitarized zone. 7 
During the 1967 fiscal years, the United States Military Assistance 
Program for Thailand was budgeted at $62 million. Total military expend-
itures were undoubtedly much greater because many expenses connected with 
the air bases were charged to the American budget in Vietnam. An example 
was the completion by the United States of a $65 million communications 
network in Thailand to link up the various connnand headquarters in 
Vietnam. 8 This American Military Assistance Program, which officially 
furnished the Thai government, took the form of training and materiel for 
the Thai units to man those bases. The establishment of an American 
military presence in Thailand represented the installation of a strategy 
of counter-insurgency that had military as well as political implications. 
The Kingdom's strategic importance and its anti-Communist posture provided 
the United States gove~nment tangible benefits in its military strategy 
and operations in Indochina.9 Despite the military and non-military aid 
which was expended to build those conditions of development and security 
considered necessary to frustrate the incipient communism insurgency, 
there were signs that revolutionary patterns found earlier in South 
Vietnam were being duplicated in Thailand. 
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The Thai government was interested in developing strategic, 
economic, and political strength in order to prevent Communist penetra-
tion of northeast Thailand. 10 By 1963 approximately $300 million for 
economic and military assistance programs had been spent. American 
economic assistance to Thailand increased substantially in 1965, while 
military assistance went up from $31.4 million in 1966 to $170.5 million 
in 1967. 11 A major reason for these increases was an effort to cqunter 
the growing insurgency in Thailand itself. However, it must be recog-
nized that the insurgency was being stimulated to some extent by the 
mounting American presence in Thailand. 12 
An important distinction between the United States and Thailand in 
their respective commitments to the Vietnam War was the fact that the 
commitments were.made through a regional organization. 13 Most basic wa~ 
the.SEATO treaty, but this document was ambiguous in a number of ways. 
In fact, the Thais were so concerned over one ambiguity in the treaty 
that they induced the United States government in 1962 to make a clarify-
ing declaration in the ,Rusk-Thanat communique. In that communique, the·. 
United States.government did agree to an interpretation of its SEATO ob-
ligation vis-a-vis Thailand in 1962 that in effect established a bilateral 
defense relationship between the two states. 14 On top of the somewhat 
ambiguous commitments in SEATO and the declarations of American officials, 
there were numerous governmental arrangements between the two countries 
arising from the large scale American presence in Thailand. American 
ground combat forces were sent to Thailand in 1961, 1962, and 1963, along 
with the establishment of the air bases in the late 1960's. This pro-
vided an implicit commitment of United States forces in the event that a. 
serious crisis should develop in Laos and Vietnam by the Communist 
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advances. Not surprisingly, therefore, signs of trouble were apparent 
in Thailand's northeastern region. In the border areas just across the 
Mekong River, Thai security forces had fought a number of limited engage-
ments with guerrilla units. It was likely that these terrorists had 
liaison with the .Communist forces in Laos and Vietnam. This northeastern 
area was likely to witness increasing trouble for Thailand's security 
interest and the United States might have to come to her defense. Be-
sides these implicit conunitments, some believe that an American moral 
obligation to Thailand was generated by Thailand's willingness to let the 
United States use its territory for bases to prosecute the war in 
Vietnam. 15 
Another dimension of the American commitment to Thailand was re-
flected in the United States government's interest in stabilizing South 
Vietnam as well as the rest of Indochina.16 In the context of the so-
called domino theory, Thailand would "fall" if South Vietnam should 
collapse and Thailand would probably be forced to assume a neutralist 
position toward the Communist bloc. 17 Since South Vietnam was considered 
vital to American interests in Asia and the American government justified 
its intervention in Vietnam accordingly, the United States was indirectly 
conunitted to the defense of Thailand through various aid programs and 
counter-insurgency activities to support the Thai government against 
internal subversion. The United States has, therefore, borne the princi-
pal cost of equipping a modern Thai army of over 130,000 men and 30,000 
militarized police. The bulk of United States military and economic aid 
to Thailand over the years has been grant assistance for defense or 
defense-related purposes. 1 8 
The United States' response to the military deterioration of, South. 
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Vietnam until 1964 had remained limited to indirect military involvement.· 
One reason for the subsequent American escalation was the need to stabi~ 
lize a deteriorating political situation in Saigon. The bombing of North 
Vietnamese objectives and the air war in South Vietnam proved to be of 
limited value. The American military presence and the sustained bombings 
of 1965 did bolster the successive regimes in Saigon. Direct American 
military intervention improved the military situation from the view point 
of Washington and Saigon. It was expected that such offensive actions 
would bring imminent military defeat to the Communists. 19 
The decision by the American leadership to escalate the war to the 
stage of bombing North Vietnam was designed to punish North Vietnam with 
a moderate but not a fatal attack, and to demonstrate to Hanoi that its 
territory would no longer serve as a sanctuary,20 In a more limited 
military sense, the attacks were intended to make. the war more difficult 
to conquct, especially in supplying the forces below the 17th parallel. 
Most.important, the attacks,were designed to make Hanoi adopt a more 
reasonable bargaining position by raising the cost of the war, demon-
strating America's will to persist, and showing that the North's Communist 
allies (especially the People's Republic of China) would not join in the 
struggle. 21 In this effort, the American bases in Thailand and the air 
operations over Vietnam reflecte4 a determ~nation to preserve the non-
Communist regime in South Vietnam and to deter further threats to American 
political and territorial interests there. Thus, American and Thai forces 
were prepared to establish control over the strategically important seg-
ments of Indochina.22 
The Vietnam War became a major source of political instability along 
Thailand's eastern border as Communist-supplied insurgents within the 
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northeastern part of the country caused a political problem for the Thai 
government. The outcome of the war in Vietnam was considered to be 
vitally important to Thai security. According to one Thai view: 
The impact of the Vietnam War on Thailand is total; it relates 
directly to our country's security interest; it has altered our 
way of life and swollen our economy. It should not surprise 
anyone that we. are vitally concerned about .what happens 
there .. 23 
Thai uni ts were sent to Vietnam in 1967. In addition, six air bases and 
a giant naval base were provided the United States within Thailand from 
which to conduct the war. These efforts represented the Thai government's 
grave concern about the future of Vietnam. Communist domination of a11 
Vietnam was viewed by the Thai leadership as a major threat to the 
security and stability of Thailand.24 
As the kingdom faced increased Connnunist pressure along its exposed 
Laotian boundary, Thai and American efforts to counter the insurgency 
called for maximum cooperation. Thai-United States cooperation was 
intended to develop f4e poverty-stricken northeast, thus blocking 
Communist penetration. In addition to the United States military bases, 
a key electronic intelligence unit was stationed in the northeast at a 
place called Ramasun, about five miles south of a major air base at 
U-dorn; it became a major American instrument to interrupt the Connnunists' 
offensive. Ramasun was involved in electronic research projects and 
connnunication research and development. It provided rapid radio relay 
and service connnmications for defense of the United States and Thailand, 
as well as the whole region. Ramasun was able to monitor low frequency 
radio transmissions in North Vietnam and China that could not be picked 
up by more remote listening stations or satellites. 25 
This key electronic intelligence was.also regarded as one of the 
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most important "residual interests" that the United States had sought to 
obtain from.Thailand along with the right to use Thai territory for 
American military strategy. An Amei;-ican officiai noted: "Without 
Thailand, there is no place between the .Philippines and Iran where we can 
land a military plane. 1126 Thailand represented more than a site for 
bases in the Vietnam War, for that could.be only temporary. More impor-
tant to the Americans in the long run was Thailand's role in helping to 
bring about cooperation among Southeast Asian nations as part of the 
large task of the United States government to achieve long-term stability 
in Asia. 27 To observers, the United States seemed to assume the whole 
responsibility for. the security of the ,non-Co~nist nations in Southeast 
Asia, which caused the United States to become the policeman in the eyes 
of the rest of the worl.d. But there was some evidence that the United 
States also sought to stabilize power relationships in Asia and to main-
tain a regional balance of power. 28 It endeavored to institutionalize 
international relationships within this sensitive strategic region so 
that bitter conflicts among small regional countries would not readily 
escalate into large scale confrontations between the major powers. 29 The 
United States' policy to stabilize power relationships in the region also 
coincided with modifications in the foreign policies of the Soviet Union 
and the. People's Republic of Chinca during the l.ate of 1960 's and early 
1970's, which represented the ,politics of "detente" among the super 
powers. In effect, this line of policy has been supplemented by a new 
role to stabilize power relationships between smaU regional states. 30 
Much of the credit on this score belongs to Thailand, especially its 
Foreign Ministe.r Thanat Khoman. · Not only was he instrumental in creating 
the Association of Southeast Asia (A.S.A), representing the Philippines, 
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Thailand and Malaysia in 1961, but he also served as an intermediary when 
the other Southeast Asian governments had quarreled. Thailand became a 
leading supporter of the Asian and Pacific Council (A.S.P.A.C.), a 
multination group established in 1966. 31 This was particularly important 
to those American leaders who saw in Asian regionalism an important way 
to help small and weak Southeast Asian nations build an effective barrier 
against a resurgent China.32 
Pursuit by the United States of policy goals in Asia still involved 
preservation of the status quo in the area. American interest, and ulti-
mately American national security, as Secretary Rusk mentioned in a news 
conference held on October 12, 1967, would be gravely jeopardized should 
a Communist power succeed in establishing control over those areas in 
Southeast Asia that the United States was endeavoring to protect by its 
stan.d in Vietnam. He said: 
These are vitally important matters to us, who are both a 
Pacific and Atlantic power. So, we have a tremendous stake in 
the ability of .the free nations of Southeast Asia to live in 
peace ... That does not mean that we ourselves have nominated 
ourselves to be the policemen of all Asia .•. But we have a 
part, we have to accept a share, and we have accepted that· 
share as part of the vital national interest of the United 
States. 33 
It appeared that on the ,basis of an overriding "security interest" 
of the United States in the area, the American government continued to 
take an active interest in the politics of Southeast Asia at both the 
regional and national levels.3 4 The United States, as part of its global 
policy, wanted to preserve the loyalty of its allies and its own credi-
bility in Southeast Asia. As early as February 1970, when there was much 
talk about a possible United States withdrawal from Southeast Asia, 
President Nixon in a special message to the United States Congress prom-
ised that the United States would remain involved in Asia and added, "we 
are a Pacific powe~, we have learned that peace for us is much less 
likely if there is no peace in Asia. 11 35 
In October of 1972, a reporter for U. ~~ News ~World Report 
interviewed Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., who was serving as Specia+ 
Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations in the Pentagon. McCain was 
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asked: "In the event of an agreement to end the war in Vietnam, would it 
still be advisable for the .United States .to use the .bases in Thailand? 
His reply was: . 
Yes, we need to retain our access to some of those bases, be-
cause as.I said before, an end of the war between the North and 
South is not going to be ~he end of the fighting in the rest of 
Southeast Asia. On the northeastern and northel'.11 borders of 
Thailand, for example, t~e Coll)munists are on the move. The 
real concern in Thailand, because if Thailand ever fell, the 
C.onununists could take all of the Southeast Asian peninsular. 
Thailand is the key-stone to the entire area.. We must not 
abandon out role as the Pacific power.36 
There has been talk of establishing an American naval base at Sattahip in 
the gulf of Thailand "to supplement-if not to replace.,.the naval base at 
Subic Bay in the Philippines" and to enable Seventh Fleet warships oper-
ating from Sattahip to counter quickly Russia's determined bid to expand 
its authority in the region.37 
The presence of American milit~ry installations in Thailand have 
pointed up some of tl).e advantages for the United States in this type of 
overseas base. American facilities in U-dorn or Sattahip mean more than 
just the security of Thailand. They have been extremely important in the 
forward strategy of the United States.to assert its influence and power 
over the res.t of Southeast Asi.a. They have served as a symbol of 
Washington's .. determination to stand. by the weak governments that support 
American policy and interests. The naval and tactic~! air forces of the 
United States in the Western Pacific have derived part of their opera-
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
For the United States, the main issue of the conflict in Vietnam was 
the expansion of Communist power. Th~ war in Vietnam was viewed by the 
American leadership as part and parcel of its over-all strategy of con-
taining the Communists throughout the world. American interests were 
considered to be directly affected by the outcome of the Indochinese War 
after the defeat of the French in Vietnam. The United States assumed a 
"protectorate position" in support of the South Vietnamese regime against 
the Communists when the French left in 1954. 
The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was negotiated soon 
after as a symbol of the continuuing "strategic" defense of the region. 
It was .. more. of a symbol of American commitment to Sou the as t Asia than a 
real regional security treaty. In the post Geneva period, especially 
after 1965, because of the absence of South Vietnamese military strength 
and political stability, the United States government committed itself as. 
a full military participant in the South Vietnamese conflict. As the war 
continued, the United Stat~s sought to develop a working coalition of 
concerned nations in the region. This coalition included Thailand. The 
war in Vietnam involved Thailand increasingly as a major supplier of air 
bases for United States' aircraft involved in the conflict in Vietnam. 
This study was concerned primarily with an analysis of the policies 
of the United States government which were designed to keep Thailand 
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committed to the United States. Also, a major concern of the study was 
an examination of the rationales which the United States and Thailand 
developed to justify their relationship to one.another and to the Vietnam 
Conflict. 
Research for this study has produced evidence that the United States 
government decided to establish bases and other military facilities 
initially in Thailand to protect South Vietnam from being dominated by 
North Vietnam. In the long run, Thailand was viewed as a pivot area in 
American strategy to prevent the .Communists from taking over not only 
South Vietnam, but also Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand itself. It was be-
lieved that a Communist victory in Indochina would expose other countries 
in the region to Communist influence. In fact, during the 1940's and 
1950's, only North Vietnam in the Indochina region came under the control 
of the Communists. This rather favorable outcome of the earlier Indo-
chinese War provided hope on the part of American officials that 
Communist territorial gains could be localized. 
The misconception that each Communist territorial gain constituted 
for the United States a calamity of the first magnitude had as.its 
corollary the proposition that the United States must commit its military 
power to the defense of any territory that might be threatened by 
Communists subversion or overt attack. The indiscriminate policy of 
forming alliances and offering American military support to whatever 
nation was willing to accept it reflected that conviction. 
This study revealed that Th~iland was regarded as a country in which 
the United States' policy of containing the Communists could be 
effectively rationalized under SEATO. Both the Thai and United States 
governments subsequently made bilateral commitments by asserting a mutual 
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obligation to defend the region under this alliance. It was found that 
the mutual "commitment" between the United States and Thailand implied 
an American defense of Thailand against any armed attack by Communist 
forces in.the region. Thailand's obligations were to provide bases with-
in its own territory.for United States military forces and to deploy 
troops in Vietnam and Cambodia. 
In reference to the war in Vietnam, it was found that the SEATO 
treaty provided the basis for a mutual understanding between the United 
States and Thailand which permitted the United States to use air bases in. 
Thailand. To the American government, the .SEATO treaty was very useful 
throughout the 1960's--if for no other reason than justification for its 
ever-growing military presence in Thailand. Also, it was.found that the 
United States government interpreted the SEATO obligation that established 
a bilateral mutual defense relationship between the United States and 
Thailand to justify its military intervention in South Vietnam. Under 
SEATO, protection against armed attack was provided in 1954 to the former 
Indochinese states (South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). They were for-
bidden to join the alliance by the terms of Geneva Accords. Thai and 
American leaders soon thereafter became anxious about the continuous 
movement of Communist forces into South Vietnam. · Eventually substantial 
Thai-American involvement to sustain the South Vietnamese regime resulted, 
and relationships between the two states evolved to the point of substan-
tial mutual involvement in the war. In effect, it was in part an American 
pledge to assist the Saigon regime through military means that the United 
States .. government was subsequently to escalate the massive American par-
ticipation in the war. Thailand served American military purposes by. 
providing an important base area in support of the escalation and as a 
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rehabilitation center for United States soldiers on leave from Vietnam. 
Further, it was found that American policy planners tended to empha-
size military force over political means in those measures which they 
designed to stabilize South Vietnam. This was the reason for the escala-
tion of the war to the stage of bombing North Vietnam and for the ,huge._ 
military build-up in Thailand. However, the major objective of the 
American government was political. It was concern.ed that its use of 
force be viewed as legitimate and that North Vietnam and its allies be 
convinced that they would,be effectively opposed. The United States was 
also concerned that its allies, especially South Vietnam and Thailand, be 
assured that they would be supported against CoIIDilunist military action. 
But the most important objective was to safeguard what were then perceived 
to be the United States' national interests. It appeared that wherever 
American interests were involved, military and economic aid would be 
extended to the governments that demonstrated a will and capability to 
resist the CoIIDilunists. The United States government believed that the 
Indochinese problem could be solved most effectively by military means 
and that states .such as Thailand and South Vietnam were a key factor in 
the entire area from this standpoint. By assuming that such intervention 
would prevent further threats to American interests and preserve the 
political status quo in the region, an important rationale of United 
States military action was _provided. 
From the ,standpoint of Thailand, it was found that Thai military 
cooperation with the United States was _in part predicated on the Thai 
leadership's felt need to sustain itself in political power against the 
internal politic al opposition in Bangkok. Additionally, this leadership 
was concerned with the. insurgent movement within Thailand itself. The 
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presence of American military power in Thailand and the conunitment of the 
United States to defend Thailand against Communist military action were 
deemed essential to dealing with both of these problems. It was conceived 
by the Thai military leaders that American support was the main stabi-
lizing instrument. With the United States' military and economic power 
heavily committed, the ultimate reckoning by the Thai government was that 
the American presence could make up for its own lack of broad popular 
support and could provide the necessary back up to overcome the indige-
nous revolutionaries in the northeastern part of the country who had 
secured support from North Vietnam and the People's Republic of China. 
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APPENDIX A 
National Security Council "Action" paper No. 1074-A, April 5, 
1954: Alternative forms of commitment of United States combat 
forces for operation in Indochina: 
In concert with the Free world reaction: The United Kingdom, 
apprehensive of the possibility of war with Communist China, 
would approve a United States intervention in Indochina only if 
convinced that it was.necessary for the prevention of further 
expansion of Communist power in Asia. Australia and New 
Zealand would fully support such a United State.s action, and 
Canada to a lesser extent. Nationalist China and Republic of 
Korea would welcome United States intervention in Indochina, 
since both would hope that this would lead to a general war be-
tween the United States and Communist China. Thailand, if as-
sured of United States guarantee of adequate permanence would 
probably permit the use of Thai territory .and facilities. The 
Philippines would support United States intervention. Japan 
would lend unenthusiastic diplomatic support. India and Indo-
nesia strongly, and Cylon and Burma to a lesser extent, would 
dissapprove United States intervention. Other members of the. 
Arab-Asian bloc would be unsympathetic especially because of 
seeming United States support for French colonialism. The NATO 
countries, other than those mentioned above, would generally 
support United States military action, but their support would 
be tempered by fear of expansion of the hostilities and the 
effect on the NATO build-up. The attitude of most of Latin-
American countries would tend to be non-committal. 
Regional action: It would be feasible to secure support of a 
regional grouping for United States replacement of French 
forces in Indochina. In the contingency of French withdrawal, 
Thailand, in particular,_ and other states in general, would 
wish to assure themselves that the United State.s was really 
committed to fully replaGing French strength in the area. If 
they were convinced this was the case, and if the nature of 
French withdrawal made replacement by the United States troops, 
practicable, they would support a United States effort. 
Source: U. S. Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 
1945-1964: A Study Prepared ~the Department of Defense 
(Washington, D.C., 1971), Vol. 9, pp. 315-316, 329-330. 
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APPENDIX B 
The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, recommended the ."prestocks" of 
aviation fuel and a.mmuni tion to be built-up in Thailand in case 
of escalation of the war in Vietnam were to take place. It was 
the evident that America's need for Thai cooperation: 
THE JOINT STAFF 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
Washington 25, D.C., 
DJSM-1383-61 
14 November 1961 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
Subject: South Vietnam 
1. Reference is made to the memorandum for the National Secu-
rity Council, subject as above, dated 13 November 1961. 
2. Briefs of the military actions contained in the draft Na-
tional Security Action Memorandum attached to the above refer-
ence memorandum are enclosed. These briefs are indexed to 
relate directly to appropriate paragraphs of the draft memo-
randum. Because of the security classification involved with 
the provision of additional equipment and United States uni-
formed personnel for special intelligence in South Vietnam, the . 
brief for this .item has been provided separately. 
3. In connection with paragraph 1 of the draft memorandum, the 
Joint Staff considers it militarily desirable to preposition 
forces and equipment and is currently considering augmentation 
of US Army forces Pacific with one 1nfantry division plus ap-
propriate logistic and combat support units. CINPAC has recom-
mended that, in consideration of the requirement to locate army 
forces in close proximity to Southeast Asia, this division be · 
prepositioned in the Philippines. The Army has established a 
Pacific Forward Depot on Okinawa for prestocking essential non-
air-transportable items of material required for a one division 
force. In addition, there are ammunition stocks in Japan. 
There are also limited prestocks of aviation fuel and ammuni-
tion in Thailand for use by the .USAF. Prestocks .have not been 
established in South Vietnain. CINPAC has recommended and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff have concurred in the additional pre-
stocking of railroad rolling stock, petrole'um, oil, lubricants, 
ammunition, heavy engineering equipment and other material in 
Southeast Asia for use by United States forces in contingency 
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action. These recommendations are currently under considera-
tion by the Department.of Defense. If these necessary country-
to-country bilateral agreements with Thailand and South Vietnam 
will be required. 
Earl G. Wheeler 
Director, Joint Staff 
Lieutenant General, USA. 
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Source: u. S. Department of Defense, "Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff-South Vietnam," United States-Vietnam Relations, 
1945-1969: ~ Study Prepared £x_. the Department £!_ Defense (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1971), Vol. 11, pp. 368-369. The Director, Joint 
Staff, General Wheeler to the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Lenmitzer on November 14, 1961. 
APPENDIX C 
A joint statement issued by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and 
Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand, on March 6, 1962. 
The Foreign Minister visited.Washington March 1-6, where he 
conferred with .President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, and other 
government officials in the matters of mutual concern: 
(Press .release 145 dated March .6) 
The Foreign Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, and the Secre-
tary of Stat~, Dean Rusk, met on .sevei:al occasions.during the 
past few days .. for discussions on the current situation in 
Southeast Asia, the So~theast Asia Coliective Defense Treaty 
and the security of Thailand. 
The Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United States re-
gards the preservation of the independence and integrity of 
Thailand as.vitai to the national interest of the United States 
and to world peace. He expressed the firm intention of the 
United States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in 
resisting Communist aggression and subversion. 
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary.of State reviewed the 
close association of Thailand and the Un~ted States in the 
Southeast .Asia Collective Defense Treaty and agreed. that such 
association is an effective detei:rent to direct Communist ag-
gression against.Thailand. They agreed that the Treaty pro-
vides the basis for the signatories collectively to assist 
Thailand in case of Communist armed attack against that coun-
try. The Secretary of .State assured. the Foreign Minister that 
in the event of such aggression, the .United States intends to 
give full effect to its obligations under. the Treaty to act to 
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes. · The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obliga-
tion of the United States does not depend upon the prior agree-
ment of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty 
obligation is individual as well as collective. 
In reviewing measures to meet indirect aggression, the Secre-
tary .of State stated that the .United States regards its 
commitments to Thailand under.the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Treaty and under its bilateral economic and military 
assistance agreements with Thailand as providing an important 
basis for United States .actions to help Tha:lland meet indirect 
aggression .. In this connection the Secretary reviewed with the 
Foreign Minister the actions being taken by the United States 
71 
to assist the Republic of Vietnam to meet the threat of indi-
rect aggression. 
The Foreign Minister assured the Secretary of State of the 
determination of the government of Thailand to meet the .threat 
of indirect aggression by pursuing vigorously measures for the 
economic and social welfare and the safety of its people. 
The situation in Laos was reviewed in detail and full agreement 
was reached in the necessity for the stability of Southeast 
Asia, of achieving a free, independent and truly neutral Laos. 
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State reviewed the 
mutual efforts of their governments to increase the capabili-
ties and readiness of the Thai armed forces to defend the king-
dom. They noted also that the United States is making a 
significant contribution to this effort and that the United 
States intends to accelerate future deliveries to the greatest 
extent possible. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister also 
took note of the work of the Joint Thai-United States Committee 
which has been established in Bangkok to assure effective coop-
eration in social, economic and military measures to increase 
Thailand's national capabilities. They agreed that this Joint 
Committee and its subcommittees should continue to work toward 
the most effective utilization of Thailand's resources and 
those provided by the United States to promote Thailand's 
development and security. · 
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary were in full agreement 
that continued economic and social progress and the Thai 
government's plans to accelerate development, particularly 
Thailand's continuing determination fully to utilize its own 
resources in moving toward its development goals. 
The Foreign Minister and the .Secretary of State also discussed 
the desirability of an early conclusion of a treaty of friend-
ship, commerce and navigation between the two countries which 
would bring into accord with current conditions the existing 
treaty of 1937. 
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Source: "Secretary Rusk, Thai Foreign Minister Discuss Matters of Mutual 
Concern," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVI, No. 1187 
(March 26, 1962), pp. 498-499. 
APPENDIX D 
On May 15, 1962, President Kennedy at the invitation of the 
Royal'Thai Government ordered United States troops into 
Thailand because of attacks in Laos and Vietnam by Communist 
forces. Following are statements issued by President Ken,nedy 
and.the Royal Thai Government on May lS; the text of a.letter 
from Ambassador Charles W. Yost, Deputy United States Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, to the United Nations Secre-
tary-General informing him of the United States action; and a 
statement made by William Worth, Deputy Secretary General of 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, at the conclusion of 
the meeting of. SEATO Council representatives on May 16: 
Statement £.l· President Kennedy, May ~· 
(White House press release dated May 15) 
Following joint consideration by the Governemtns of the United 
States and Thailand of the situation in Southeast Asia, the 
Royal Thai Government has invited, and I have today ordered, 
additional elements of the United States military forces, both 
ground and air, to proceed to Thailand and to remain there 
until further orders. These forces are to help insure the 
territorial integrity of this peac~ful country. 
The dispatch of the United States forces to Thailand was con-
sidered desirable because of recent attacks in Laos by Commu-
nist forces and the subsequent movement of Communist military 
units toward the border of Thailand. · 
A threat to Thailand is of a grave concern to the United 
States. I have, therefore, ordered certain additional American 
military forces into Thailand in order that we may be in a 
position to fulfill speedily our obligations under the Manila 
Pact of 1954, 1 a defense agreement which was approved over-
whelmingly .by the United States Senate and Foreign Minister of 
Thailand referred in their joint statement of March 6, 1962. 2 
We are in consultation with SEATO governments on the situation. 
I emphasize that this is a defensive act on t~e part of the 
United States and wholly consistent with the United Nations 
C.harter, which specifically recognizes that nations have an 
inherent to take collective measures for self-defense. In the 
spirit of that charter I have.directed that the Secretary 
General of the United Nations be informed of the actions that 
we are taking. · 
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There is no change of our policy toward Laos, which continues 
to be the reestablishment of an effective cease-fire and prompt 
negotiations for a government of national union. · 
Thai Statement, May .!~.: 
The recent events in the Kingdom of Laos have now developed in-
to an increasingly critical and dangerous situation. The pro-
Communist Pathet Lao, with the support of several Communist 
countries, has engaged itself in premediated actions by the 
seizure of Muong Sing and Nam Tha in deliberate and flagrant 
violation of the cease-fire agreement. Moreover, the pro-
Conununist elements have pushed their forces i~ the southwestern 
direction toward that Thai border. Such incursions can only 
mean that the pro-Communist elements not only seek to gain 
power over and to cqntrol the Kingdom of Laos, but also desire 
to expand further their domination and influence without limit. 
These circumstances constitute a threat to the kingdom of 
Thailand and the safety of the Thai people. 
In the face of this threat, His Majesty's Government and gov-
ernments of friendly nations which are concerned over the 
security and safety of Thailand consider it necessary to adopt 
measures to prevent the danger from spreading into this 
country. 
In the consideration of the provisions of the joint statement 
of March 6, 1962, issued by the United States Secretary of 
State and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Thanat Khoman), in 
which the following important provision is included: 11The 
Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United States regards 
the preservation of the independence and integrity of .Thailand 
as vital to the national interest of the United States and to 
world peace. He expressed the firm intention of the United 
States to aid Thailand, its ally, and historic friend, in re-
sisting Conununist aggression and subversion", and pursuant to 
the obligations under the SEATO treaty, the United States gov-
ernment and His Majesty's Government have agr@ed that some 
units of the United States forces be stationed in Thailand for 
the purpose of cooperating with the .Thai Armed Forces in de-
fending and preserving the peace and security of the Kingdom 
of Thailand against the threat of the pro-Communist troops 
which are presently approaching the Thai territory. 
It is hereby announced to the people of Thailand with the re-
quest that they cooperate fully with the government in the firm 
determination to protect and maintain the freedom, integrity, 
independence and sovereignty of the Thai .nation. 
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Letter to !:!_. N. Secretary-General, May .!.§_. 
(U.S./U.N. press release 3994 dated May 16) 
May 15, 1962 
Dear Mr. Secretary General: I wish to inform you that in re-
sponse to a request of the Government of Thailand, the Presi-
dent of the United States has ordered additional elements of 
United States military forces to Thailand. 
You will recall that, in his address on September 25, 19613 to 
the General Assembly, the President brought to the attention of 
the General Assembly two threats to the peac~ which caused con-
cern to the United States. The first concerned Southeast Asia 
and the second Germany and Berlin. 
Consistent with the policy of the United States to keep the 
Un~ted Nations fully informed as to events affecting the main-
tenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia, 
I am informing you of the President's decision. This decision 
was considered necessary because of recent attacks in Laos by 
Communist forces and subsequent movements of Communist military 
uni ts toward the border of Thailand. The forces of the United 
States. are to help ensure the territorial integrity of Thailand 
which now faces a threat of Communist aggression. 
Sincerely yours, 
Charles W. Yost 
SEATO Statement, May ~· 
The Council representatives met this morning and reviewed the 
situation in the treaty area. They heard statements from the 
Un1ted States and Thai representatives of moves which have al-
ready begun for deployment of additional United States forces 
to help insure the territorial integrity of Thailand. The 
Council representatives welcomed the detail information pro-
vided. They noted that continuing consultations were in 
progress among SEATO nations for the purpose of considering 
further possible moves by other member co'lmtries. 
They further noted that movement of United States forces into 
the Kingdom of Thailand was entirely precautionary and defen-
sive in character but that it also served as a warning that any 
Communist aggression would be resisted. 
The movement of United States forces to cooperate with and to 
reinforce Royal Thai Armed Forces is wholly consistent with the. 
United Nations Charter, and the .Council representatives noted 
that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has .. been in-
formed of the action taken. 
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All SEATO member governments have on many occasions publicly 
stated their desire for a united independent Laos, with a truly 
neutral government, and ·for the reestablishment of an effective 
cease-fire. 
1For text, see Bulletin ,of (Sept. 20, 1954), p. 393. 
2For text, see Ibid., (Mar. 26, 1962), p. 498. 
3For text, see Ibid., (Oct. 16, 1961), p. 619. 
Source: "President Sends Troops to Thailand, U. S •. Policy Toward Laos 
Unchanged," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVI, No. 1197 
(June 4, 1962), pp. 904-906. 
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